This empirical note re-examines the causal linkages between military expenditures and economic growth for the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and 
Introduction
Over the past several decades, the importance of military expenditures in the economic development process has led researchers to empirically identify the nature of causal linkages exists between military expenditures and economic growth. This empirical note represents our attempt to study the causal relationship between military expenditures and economic growth in a group of countries, i.e. for the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the United States over the period . The exponential rise in the growth and economic power of the emerging markets since the 1990s, with the emerging economies in general, and the BRICS economies in particular, have received widespread attention within the literature. Clearly, the BRICS economies stand out amongst all the emerging economies and have demonstrated remarkable economic progress over recent years.
It is estimated that about two-thirds of the anticipated increase in GDP by the BRICS economies is likely to come from higher-end real growth. The BRICS countries and the United States are already playing important roles in global financial development, exerting significant influences on economic growth throughout the global economy and markets. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2011 (SIPRI, , 2012 (SIPRI, , 2013 report, the United States, China, and Russia are among the top three countries with the largest military budgets in 2013, followed by India ranked 9 and Brazil ranked 12. Russia, the United States and China are three main arm traders in the world. These three countries were responsible for more than 60 percent of all arms deliveries of the world during -2012 (SIPRI, 2013 .
This empirical note re-investigates the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and in the United States over the period 1988-2012 by focusing on country-specific analyses. To detect these causal linkages, the panel causality approach has been applied, which accounts for both cross-country interrelations and country-specific heterogeneity. While the United States has led the global rise in military spending over the past decade, this trend has been followed by many emerging (or re-emerging) regional powers such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa (BRICS in our case; SIPRI, 2011). All these rapidly growing economies have key economic and political roles in their respective regions and, sometimes, globally. All these 5 countries are also developing as military powers through their engagement in significant military modernization programmes. In BRICS countries cases, current conflict is a driver of military spending. For India, the conflict has aggravated due to the addition of the growing Naxalite movement along with the perennial conflict with Pakistan and that in Kashmir. Regional disputes and rivalries also create a desire not to lag behind other countries, even where relations are currently peaceful. For China, the overwhelming US military dominance in the region is a concern, especially in relation to potential conflict over Taiwan, whereas, India is concerned with China's growing military might, given the two countries' border disputes and rivalry to increase influence in the Indian Ocean region. Russia meanwhile views an expanding NATO as a potential, if not a current, threat. Even in the absence of regional rivalries, a perception of military power as a source of status may be a motivating factor, as in the cases of Brazil and South Africa. High military spending can be controversial in the face of more pressing social needs. In Brazil, this tension has recently led to changes in budget priorities regarding military spending. In South Africa, the recent major arms procurement package has been severely criticized for diverting funds from poverty and development goals, as well as for corruption. In India, however, civil society criticism on military spending is countered by strong popular concern over Pakistan (SIPRI, 2011) .
This empirical note represents our attempts to use a new panel Granger causality approach, based on the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model and Wald tests with country-specific bootstrap critical values followed by the Kónya (2006) This empirical note has been divided in five sections. After introduction section, section 2 provides the data used in the study. The third section briefly describes the bootstrap panel Granger causality test proposed by Kónya (2006) and section 4 presents the empirical results, along with their economic and policy implications. Finally, section 5 concludes the study.
Data
This empirical note uses annual data for the period of 1988 to 2012, for both the BRICS countries (Brail, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the United States. The variables used in this study include the per capita real military expenditure (PRME), the per capita real GDP (PRGDP), 2 along with the per capita real capital expenditure (PRK) as a control variable.
All variables are measured in constant 2005 US dollars. Both PRGDP and PRK have been taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2013) , whereas the PRME from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2013) . Tables 1 to 3 Bai and Kao (2006) demonstrated that the assumption of cross-sectional independence is difficult to satisfy in panel data, neglecting this information could cause bias and inconsistent results. 2 Per capita numbers used in our study have two following reasons. First, per capita numbers are less sensitive to territorial changes. Second, per capita numbers provide variables in the same units for large and small countries and they can control for the scale of the economy. Table 3 , we also find that military expenditures as a share of GDP decreased over time for most of the countries studied. 
Methodology
The econometric method used in this empirical note has briefly been outlined in the following two subsections.
Preliminary Analysis

Cross-Sectional Dependence and Slope Homogeneous Tests
One of the important assumptions in the bootstrap panel causality is the existence of cross-sectional dependency among the countries in the panel. In case of cross-sectional correlated errors, the estimator from the regression system described with the SUR is more efficient than the estimator with the pooled ordinary least squares (pooled OLS) model because the country-by-country OLS approach does not consider cross-sectional dependency.
Therefore, testing for cross-sectional dependency is the most crucial issue for the selection of an efficient estimator and hence for the panel causality results. The second important issue in the bootstrap panel causality approach is testing for cross-country heterogeneity. In order to test the null hypothesis of slope coefficient homogeneity against the alternative hypothesis, the familiar approach is to apply the Wald principle. Details on the cross-sectional dependence and slope homogeneous tests, interested readers can refer to Chang et al., (2014) , Chang and Tsai (2015) , Pan et al., (2015) , and Zhong et al., (2015) .
Bootstrap Panel Granger Causality Test
To measure the determinants of causality between military expenditures and economic growth, we apply the bootstrap panel causality method proposed by Kónya (2006 
In the equation systems (1) and (2) 
Empirical Results, Economics and Policy Implications
Empirical Results
As stated earlier, testing for cross-sectional dependency and slope homogeneity in a panel causality study is crucial for selecting the appropriate estimator. The results from the cross-sectional dependence and slope homogeneity tests are reported in Table 4 . The cross-sectional dependence tests strongly indicate that the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence is rejected at the one percent level of significance. The cross-sectional dependence tests thereby support evidence of high integration among the BRICS countries and the United States, which implies that any shock that occurs in one 4 Before proceeding to estimation, optimal lag lengths must be determined. 4 Since the results from the causality test may be sensitive to the lag structure, determining the optimal lag length(s) is crucial for the robustness of empirical findings. In a large panel system, lag lengths and numbers of independent variables can cause a substantial computational burden. Following Kónya(2006) , maximal lags are allowed to differ across variables, but that need to be the same across equations. In our study, the regression system is estimated by each possible pair of 1 ly , 1 lx , 2 ly , 2 lx 1 lz , and 2 lz ; we assume from 1 to 4 lags exist, and then we choose the combinations that minimize the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. Kónya (2006) points out that this is an important step because the causality test results may depend critically on the lag structure. In general, lag decisions may cause different estimation results. Too few lags means that some important variables are omitted from the model and this specification error will usually cause incorrect estimation in the retained regression coefficients, leading to biased results. On the other hand, too many lags will waste observations and this specification error will usually increase the standard errors of the estimated coefficients, leading to inefficient results. country can quickly be transmitted to other countries. Note:
1. *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.
2. Bootstrap critical values are obtained from 10,000 replications. have been reported in Tables 5 and 6 . 5 We discuss our country by country empirical findings along with several interesting observations as follows:
The United States
In our empirical findings, we find one-way Granger causality running from military expenditures to economic growth only in case of the United States. This result indicates that military expenditures play an important role in the economic development of the United
States. However, looking to the coefficient from the economic growth equation, we find that military expenditures negatively affect economic growth (since the coefficient is negative).
These results are consistent with most of the findings of previous studies which claimed that military expenditures are harmful to economic growth. That is, if military expenditures are financed through taxes or borrowings, it will crowd-out private investment. Therefore, it is a diversion of resources away from more productive government outlays such as education and health services (Deger and Smith, 1983; Lim, 1983; Dunne and Vougas, 1999) . A reduction in military expenditures would make financial resources available for the use of other activities such as education, health, and many other social programs. Our result is not consistent with the findings of LaCivita and Frederiksen (1991) and Chang et al., (2014) . Both studies found a feedback between military expenditure and economic growth in the United States. Our empirical result is also not consistent with the findings of Atesoglu (2002 Atesoglu ( , 2009 , which states that military expenditures does not promote economic growth in real output but responds to aggregate income shocks in the United States. Our empirical findings are different from some of the previous studies might be due to the following reasons. First of all, this difference might be due to sample period selection (that we use longer period, 1988-2012) . Second, different sample group countries selected used in our study and we called this group countries effect.
Third, more advanced econometric techniques used in our study. We use bootstrap panel causality test taking into account both cross-sectional dependence and cross-country heterogeneity. Fourth, while previous studies do not consider per capita real capital expenditure (PRK) as a control variable, we have incorporated it in our panel causality model.
Brazil and India
In case of Brazil and India, we found one-way Granger causality from economic growth to military spending, and the coefficients depicted in Table 6 are also significant and positive.
The result indicates that when there is an economic boom, the military expenditures will grow in both Brazil and India. This empirical result is consistent with those of Smith and Tuttle (2008) and Heo (2010) , stating that military spending does not promote economic growth in real output but responds to aggregate income shocks.
Russia
In case of Russia, our empirical results suggest bidirectional Granger-causality (feedback) between military expenditures and economic growth. Although military expenditures may affect economic growth through several channels, for example, through a Keynesian-type aggregate demand effect, it is also plausible that economic growth may causally be prior to military expenditures. For example, a country with a higher growth rate may wish to strengthen its external as well as internal security by increasing military spending (D'Agostino et al., 2012) . This feedback relationship found in Russia implies that neither economic growth nor military expenditures can be considered exogenous. In China, the null hypothesis of no causality from military expenditure to economic growth or the other way around cannot be rejected, implying also that there is also no causality in either direction between military expenditures and economic growth in China.
China and South Africa
This result is not consistent with that found in Chang et al. (2014) , stating that military spending does promote economic growth in China. On the other hand, our result is also not consistent with those of Chang et al., (2001) , Dimitraki and Ali (2013), and Furuoka et al., (2014) that indicate a unidirectional causality from economic development to military expenditure in China. The justification for the difference between our study and that of Chang et al. (2014) might be due to sample group countries selected in our study (group countries effect). We select the BRICS and the United States and Chang et al. (2014) selected the G7 countries and China. The other reason is that if we look at Table 3 , the share of military expenditure of GDP does not change over the past two years and remains at 2 percent in China however, economic growth in China remains higher (around 8 percent) during that period. Another justification of our empirical findings might be due to the higher cooperation 14 between China and the other BRICS countries than that of China and the other G7 countries.
As we know that strategic alliance among the BRICS countries become more close and important over the past several years. China launches a new Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 and this further increase the important role of China. Further, a big country like China with its abundant resources, and we would expect some other economic and/or social factors which will affect its growth (see Chang et al. 2001) . We believe that our empirical findings are more reliable than previous papers.
2. Policy Implications
Overall, our results indicate that, except the United States, military expenditure is not a strong exogenous variable relative to economic growth for most of the BRICS countries. The results appear to indicate that military spending plays an important role in economic growth only in the United States. Our empirical results thus lead us to conclude that the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth cannot be generalized across countries.
As mentioned previously, the time series approaches overlook cross-sectional dependence across countries in the causality tests, and, therefore, they may result in misleading inferences regarding the nature of causality between military expenditure and economic growth. We find clear evidence for the existence of cross-sectional dependence among the BRICS countries and the United States. Therefore, it might be concluded that more appropriate policy implications can be derived from causality approaches that account for cross-sectional dependence. Furthermore, we also detect cross-country heterogeneity in the panel of these 6 countries, implying that each country may develop its own military policies.
Our empirical results lead us to conclude that the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth cannot be generalized across countries. This result is in line with the findings of others (Chowdhury, 1991; Landu, 1993; Kusi, 1994; Al-Yousif, 2002; Chang et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2014) , who have concluded that military expenditure depends on a number of factors including: the nature of the expenditure; the prevailing circumstances; and the concurrent government policies.
Conclusions
This 
